University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

5-28-1954

Hiroko Kawakita Hayashi v. Lorenz
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Hiroko Kawakita Hayashi v. Lorenz 42 Cal.2d 848 (1954).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/457

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

840

[42C.2d

8uARDIANSHIP OF KAWAKITA

fL A. No. 22281. Ia Beak. May 28, 1954..]

Guardianship of the Persons and Estates of HIROKO
KAWAKITA et aL, Minors. HIROKO KAWAKITA
et aL, Appellants, T. W. H. LORENZ, as Guardian, etc.,
Respondent.
[1] Guardian &Wi Ward-ProceediD.gs-Appeal-Orden Appealable.-With possible ueeptiOll of aD order granting new trial,
only those orders mentioned in Prob. Code, § 1630, are appealable in guardianship proceedings.
[I] Id.-Proceedinp-Appea.l-Orders Appealable.-8inee Prob.
Code, § 1630, does not mention an appeal from an order either
granting or denying motion to vacate or annul a prior order
of court, an appeal may be taken from such order in guardianship proceedings only if in legal ei'feet it is tantamount to one
or more of orders listed.
[8] Id.-Proceedinp-Appea.l- Orders Appealab1e.-Petitioner's
appeal from that portion of an order denying motion to annul
order for appointment of I guardian is not tantamount to an
order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship so as to be
appealable under Prob. Code, § 1630, where respondent was
discharged as guardian approximately four year before this
proceeding was commenced, and aecordingly his letteR are no
longer in ei'feet and could not be revoked bJ U!r1 on1et- to
vacate and anrml.
.

APPEAL from an ordel" of the Superier Go\llt of Imperial
County denying motion to set aside an order ror appolaobmeu.t
of guardian. L. J. KOMer, Judge. Appeal dW .....

• -orris Lwriae for .A.pprl'l P

Benou. & 1WaK,
Jtesponde1rt.

..

lIan:7 W......·...·~·Ir..... ~., ill'

TRAYNOR, J.-Hiroko Kawakita and her brot-her, '.romo,-&,
are native-born children of Yasabura Kawakita, an alien
Japanese, who was appointed guardian of his children and
of their estates in 1923. In 1927, Yasabura furnished the
funds to purchase 8 lot in Calexico on which there was a
two-story brick business building. The purchase price of the
property was $33,000. and $7,000 in improvements were
[IJ See Cal.Jur., Guardian and Ward, § 24.
JIcK. Die. Reference: [1-3] Guardian and Ware,
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added during the next ten years. Title was taken in the
names of the children as tenants in common, subject to a
trust deed in favor of Yasabura. Hiroko att<!ined her majority
on October 19, 1937, and Tomoya attained his on September
26, 1942. In 1938, Yasabura filed an account of his guardianship. The court approved the account. but refused to close
the guardianship of Hiroko and her estate because of the deficit
due to Yasabura on the trust deed. in 1939. Tomora went
to Japan where he remained throughout the war and until
his return to the United States in 1946. Yasabura was sent
out of the state to an internment camp for Japanese aliens
in February, 1942. On March 10, 1942, he executed a general
power of attorney to his daughter, Hiroko, who was subsequently removed to a relocation center in Arizona in ~lay,
1942. In an instrument dated "April, 1942" Yasabura resigned his guardianship. This instrument was not filed until
1.1ay 4, 1942. On April 8. 1942, W. H. Lorenz. respondent
herein, petitioned the Superior Court of Imperial County
to be appointed guardian of the estates of Hiroko and
Tomoya, who were described in the petition as "minors"
owning the building mentioned above. The petition related
that Y asabura had been acting as guardian. but that he had
been evacuated from Imperial County and was "therefore
unable to look after this estate." The petition also stated
that respondent was "familiar with the rental of properties
and [was] willing to act as the guardian of the property
belonging to the minors." The nominatio'n filed with respondent's petition related that the "minors" owned the property
described in the petition, and that they nominated respondent
as their guardian. The nomination concluded with the following statement: "I, Hiroko Kawakita am now 25 years of
age and Tomoya Kawakita is now 20 years of age." The
nomination was signed by Hiroko only. Neith,er the petition
nor the nomination was verified. Notice of hearing on the
petition was posted at the court house, but the record is bare
of any evidence that personal notice was given to the parents
of the "minors" or that a showing was made that such notice
could not be given. Nor does it appear that notice was given
to any person having the custody of the "minors" or their
estates. The printed form used for the affidavit of notice
recites only the posting of notice at the court house; the parts
relating to personal notice are crossed out. After a hearing,
of which there is no transcript, the court entered an order
011 April '¥I, 1942, reciting that "due proof having been made
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• • . and the court finding that notice of the hearing of said
petition has been given te ______ as required by law;"
and ordering that respondent be appointed guardian .. upon
his giving a surety bond
., and taking and subscribing
the oath required by law. ,. His oath was dated April 30,
1942. On the same day, respondent filed a verified petition,
in which he described himself as the •• duly appointed, qualified and acting guardian of the estate of the above named
minors, " asking that an order be made permitting him as guardian to sell the property of the guardianship estate. His letters
of guardianship were not issued until five days later, May 5,
1942. Notice of hearing on the petition for permission to
sell was posted at the court house and published three times
in a local newspaper. The record does not reveal any notice
of a place where offers or bids would be received. (Prob.
Code, §§ 1534, 780, 782.) Further, there is no record that
an appraisal was made. (Prob. Code. § 784.) The only statement of the value of the property that appears in the record
was that made by respondent in his petition. He alleged
therein that the rental value of the property was not sufficient
to pay taxes, upkeep, and the interest on the debt of $13,206.25,
secured by the trust deed to Ynsnbura; that the property was
not worth more than $6,000; and that he had received an
offer in that amount. It was further alleged in the petition
that Hiroko had attained her majority ., but that there will
be no money to go into the gU:lrdianship from the sale of
this property for the reason thst the said property is encumbered with a trust deed in favor of Y. Kawakita . . . and that
therefore the wards have no equity whatever, and [reilpondent]
therefore thinks that it will be for the best interests of this
estate that the building be sold and the estate closed." The
petition for permission to sell was subsequently granted, and
a sale was consummated to John T. Rashid for $6,000. Since
the amount due on the trust dc!'ed was greater than the sale
price, the guardianship estate rE'Ceived nothing from the sale.
The $6,000 less the costs of the sale, were deposited in the
"blocked" bank account of Ys..~bura, pursuant to a license
issued by the United States Del':utment of the Treasury. The
guardian's annual reports for 19-13 and 1944 were approved,
but the estate was not closed until October 2, 1946, when the
court discharged the guardian and ordered the assets of the
estate-$329.68-distributed to the wards.
Tomoya returned to the United States in 1946. He was
thereafter indicted for and conncted of treason. Judgment
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and sentence of death were imposed on October 8, 1948.
(United States v. Kawakifa, 96 F.Supp. 824; aff'd 343 U.S.
717 [72 S.Ct. 950, 96 L.Ed. 1249 j ; reh. den., 344 U.S. 850 [73
S.Ct. 5, 97 L.Ed. 660]; motion to modify death sentence
denied, 108 F.Supp. 627; death sentence commuted to life
imprisonment by Presidential Proclamation of October 29,
1953.)
In March 1947, Hiroko, Tomoya, and Yasabura filed an
action in the Superior Court of Imperial County against respondent and John T. Rashid, the vendee of the guardian's
sale, to quiet title to the property sold by the guardian and
to recover damages for fraud, or, alternatively, to declare the
guardian's deed null and void and to require Rashid to convey the property to the plaintiffs Hiroko and Tomoya. This
action was dismissed on motion of the defendants on February
28. 1952, for lack of prosecution. The dismissal has been
afiirmed. (Post, p. 848 [271 P.2d 18].)
The present proceedings were instituted in the Superior
Court of Imperial County on October 14, 1950, wh~n Hiroko
and Tomoya moved to "vacate, annul and declare void the
Order for Appointment of W. H. Lorenz as [their] Guardian
and all subsequent orders based thereon on the ground that
the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the aforesaid
guardianship proceedings and to make any of the orders in
this proceeding . . ." After a hearing, the court made an
order denying Tomoya's motions, denying Hiroko's motion to
annul the appointment of respondent as guardian, and grant·
ing Hiroko's motion to declare void all orders in the guardianship proceedings subsequent to the appointment of the
guardian "in particular the order concerning the sale of real
property . . ."
Hiroko noticed an appeal from that part of the order
denying her motion to annul the appointment of respondent
as her guardian and from each and every part of the order
denying the motions of Tomoya. She contends that the order
appointing the guardian is void on its face because it ap·
pears from the judgment roll that she was not a minor, that
the statutory requirements of notice were not complied with,
and that the appointment was not" necessary and convenient."
Respondent contends, on the other hand, that the order appointing him guardian is not void on its face and that Tomoya
cannot challenge the denial of his motions on the grounds that
he did not appeal and that he is now civilly dead. We have
concluded that the order appealed from is not an appealable
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order and that therefore we have no jurisdiction to review
these contentions in this proceeding.
[1] Section 1630 of the Probate Code provides that" An
appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from an. order
granting or revoking letters of guardianship; settling an account of a guardian; instructing or directing a guardian; or
refusing to make any order heretofore mentioned in this
section. " With the possible exception of an order granting
a new trial (see Estate of Armstrong, 8 Ca1.2d 204, 206 [64
P.2d 1093]), it is settled that only those orders mentioned in
section 1630 are appealable in guardianship proceedings.
(G-uardianship of Leach, 29 Ca1.2d 535, 539 [176 P .2d 369] ;
Estate of Kay, 30 Ca1.2d 215, 217 [181 P.2d 1]; see also
Kramer v. Superior Oourt, 36 Ca1.2d 159, 161 [222 P.2d 874] ;
Fredrickson v. Superior Oourt, 38 Ca1.2d 593, 596-597 [241
P.2d 541].) [2] That section does not mention an appeal
from an order either granting or denying a motion to vacate
or annul a prior order of the court. Accordingly, an appeal
may be taken from such an order only if in legal effect it is
tantamount to one or more of the orders listed. (See Lyon
v. Goss, 19 Ca1.2d 659, 670 [123 P.2d 11] ; Estate of Estrem,
16 CaJ.2d 563, 566 (107 P.2d 36].) If respondent's letters
of guardianship were still in effect ~ might reasonably
be contended that the court's order refusing to vacate and
annul the order appointing him guardian was tantamount to
an order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship. (See
In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555, 559 1222 P. 381] ; Estate of
Estrem, supra, 16 Ca1.2d 563, 566; cf., Guardianship of Brazeal, 117 Cal.App.2d 59, 60 [254 P.2d 886].) [3] In the
present case, however, respondent was discharged as guardian
approximately four years before this proceeding was commenced, and accordingly his letters are no longer in effect
and could not now be revoked by any order to vacate and
annul. Nor is the order appealed from equivalent to any of
the other orders listed in section 1630.
The appeal is dismissed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence J., eoncurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority has seen fit to di!'lmiss tbis a-ppeal upon the
sole ground that the orc1('r ap1'(',:1('<1 from is not an appealable
order. Such a decision is not ouly erroneous and m,j.sleafling
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but is based upon an inadequate analysis of section 1630 of
the Probate Code.
It is well recognized in California that the right of appeal
in probate matters is purely statutory and exists only in those
cases in which it is gh·en by statute. (Estate of Funkenstein,
170 Cal. 594 [150 P. 987] ; In re Walkerly, 94 Cal. 352 [29
P. 719J.) It is equally well recognized that the right to appeal
in guardianship matters is governed exclusively by Probate
Code, section 1630. (Guardianship of Leach. 29 Ca1.2d 535
[176 P.2d 369].)
In the case at bar the appellants appealed from an order
denying a motion "to vacate, annul and declare void" the
appointment of a guardian. Since such an order has to do with
guardianship proceedings it can only be appealed from if
provision for such appeal has been made by section 1630 of
the Probate Code. It therefore becomes apparent that the
appealability or nonappealability of the instant order is dependent upon the provisions of section 1630 of the Probate
Code.
Section 1630 of the Probate Code provides that" An appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court from an order granting
or revoking letters of guardianship; settling an account of a
guardian; instructing or directing a guardian; or refusmg to
make any order heretofore mentioned in this section." ( Emphasis added.) This section makes it unquestionably clear
that an appeal may be taken from an order granting or revoking letters of guardianship and that an appeal may also
be taken from a refusal to make either of th('se orders. Thus
an order revoking letters of guardianship is an appealable
order. Likewise an order refusing to revoke letters of guar~
dianship is also an appealable order. We therefore find that
section 1630 of the Probate Code makes express provision for
the appeal of an order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship. Not only does section 1630 expressly provide for the
appeal of orders refusing to revoke letters of guardianship
but the appeal of such orders has long been the acc('pted practice in California. (In re MorltofJ. 179 Cal. 595 [178 P. 294];
Matter of Schwartz. 171 Cal. 633 (154 P. 3041; Guardianship
of Rapp, 54 Cal.App.2d 461 [129 P.2d 1301.) The rule in
California is well established that "An appeal may be taken
from a judgment or ord('r of the superior court granting or
refusing to grant, revoking or fl'fusing to revoke, letters of
guardianship; ••• n (13 Cal.Jur. 167.)
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Having determined that an order refusing to revoke letters
of guardianship is an appealable order, we must now deter·
mine whether in the instant case the order in question was one
which refused to revoke letters of guardianship. Looking
to appellants' motion of October 14, 1950, we find that they
sought to "vacate, annul and dec1 are void the order of this
court [probate court] made in this proceeding, on May 5, 1942,
appointing W. H. Lorenz [respondent] a guardian of the
estates of said Hiroko Kawakita and Tomoya Kawakita, . . . "
This order of May 5, 1942. which appellants sought to vacate
was entitled "LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP" and it provided
among other things that" W. H. Lorenz is hereby appointed
guardian of" the estate of Hiroko and Tomoya Kawakita.
This means that appellants sought to vacate the order of
May 5, 1942, by which letters of guardianship were granted
to respondent. The court's refusal to make such an order,
vacating the order of May 5, 1942, was clearly a refusal to
"vacate, annul and declare void" the letters of guardianship.
If an order refusing to "vacate, annul and declare void" is
the same thing as an order refusing to •• revoke" then the
instant order refusing to vacate the letters of guardianship
is without question an appealable order within the provisions
of section 1630 of the Probate (Jpde.
In comparing the word "revoke" with the word "vacate"
we find that the courts of this country have frequently held
the two terms to be synonymous (People ex rel. Filippone v.
Marlin, 46 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235). As for comparing the word
"revoke" with the word" annul" we find that to revoke is "to
annul by recalling or taking back, . . . An annulling; a cancellation. . . . " Webster's New International Dictionary,
second ed., 1933, unabridged.) In Black's Law Dictionary
(third ed., 1933) it is stated that "revoke" means "To call
back; to recall; to annul an act by calling or taking it back."
The courts of this country have been in. accord with such definitions. (Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271 [56 A.2d 201] ; Mayor,
etc., of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co .. 83 Tex. 548 [19
S.W. 127]; Ford v. Greenawalt, 292 Ill. 121 [126 N.E. 555].)
It is equally well established that the word .• revoke" means
to "declare void." (O'Hagen v. K1'acke, 165 Misc. 4 [300
N.Y.S. 351, 363] ; In re Will of Barrie, 393 Ill. 111 [65 N.E.2d
433] ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Holmes' Esta·te.
148 1'-'.2d 740, 742.) In California our courts have frequently
used such terms as "revoke, " ., vacate" and" set aside" interch4D.geably. (Guardianship of Van Loan, 142 Cal. 423 (76 P.
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37]; In re Mor/zotJ, supra, 179 Cal. 595; Estate of Eikerenkotter, 126 Cal. 54 [58 P. 370] ; In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555
[222 P. 381].) It thus becomes apparent that a motion to
"vacate, annul and declare void" is the equivalent of a
motion to ., revoke. "
In the case at bar the appellants sought to .. vacate, annul
and declare void" the letters of guardianship of respondent.
This was in effect a motion to revoke such letters. The order
of the probate court refusing to revoke such letters of guardianship was clearly and unequivocally an appealable order
within the provisions of section 1630 of the Probate Code.
The net result is that the order appealed from is an appealable order and it is incumbent upon this court to decide the
case upon its merits. The mere fact that the guardian was
previously discharged is immaterial since the order to revoke
and vacate because of an absence of jurisdiction does more
than merely discharge a guardian. it goes back and canCels
all proceedings based upon such appointment. It is well
established that an order of the court which. as here. is void
on its face can be set aside at any time. (In re Dahnke,
supra, 64 Cal.App. 555; People v. Greene, 74 Cal. 400 [16 P.
197, 5 Am.St.Rep. 448]: Estate of Estrem. 16 Cal.2d 563
[107 P.2d 36].)
In the case at bar the lower court committed a patent and
obvious error in refusing to revoke the letters of guardianship since the record of the order of appointment was void
on its face. The valid appointment of a guardian for a minor
requires that notice o! the appoint.ment proceedings be given
to the parents of the minor, or alternatively. proof must be
made that such notice cannot be given. It is also requisite
that the appointment be "necessary or convenient." (Prob.
Code. §§ 1440. 1441.) In the instant case no notice was given
to the parents of Hiroko and Tomoya and an appointment
made without such notice is a nullity. (In re Dahnke, supra, 64
Cal.App. 555; Guardianship of Kerns. 74 Cal.App.2d 862
[169 P.2d 9751; Guardianship of Van Loan. supra, 142 Cal.
423.) The record also indicates that the appointment was
neither necessary nor convenient since at the time the letters
of guardianship were issued the record before the court
showed that the property of the estate was worth less than
$6,000; that liabilities amounted to more than $13.000; and
that therefore Hiroko and Tomoya had "no equity whatever"
in the property which was to constitute the guardianship
estate. The law in California is well established that an order
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appointing a guardian of the person and estate of a minor may
be vacated at any time, if the record of the appointment discloses affirmatively upon its face that the order was void
for want of jurisdiction of the court to make it. (Estate of
Eikerenkotter, supra, 126 Cal. 54.) It thus becomes apparent
that the order which appellants sought to revoke was a nullity
and should have been set aside.
For these reasons I would reverse the order appealed from
with directions to enter an order setting aside the order appointing respondent guardian of these petitioners and all
subsequent orders based thereon.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 23,
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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